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There have always been conservatives in the United States, but they have 
not always called themselves “conservatives.” Nor have they always made 
up a movement. Since the founding of the nation, there have been stal-
warts, reactionaries, traditionalists, social conservatives and temperamental 
conservatives. There have been laissez-faire liberals, who did not want the 
federal government to do much, except keeping taxes low, tariffs high and 
business regulation as lax as possible. Today we would probably call them 
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conservatives, but that was not how they described themselves. Further-
more, their activities tended to be parochial and they had no sense of being 
part of a national movement.1  
Such a national movement did not emerge until conservatives felt that 
they were being culturally and politically displaced and marginalized, and 
the thing most responsible for that happening was Franklin Delano Roos-
evelt’s New Deal. Thus, the emergence of an American conservative move-
ment was first of all a reaction to the new political order that emerged during 
the 1930s, and to the new expanded role it gave to the federal government. 
If the state had previously been viewed as a potential transgressor of indi-
viduals’ liberties, it was now to a much larger extent seen as a promoter and 
guarantor of social rights. 
The connotations of liberalism clearly changed during the 1930s. That 
created the desire for both a new political brand and the organizing of a 
principled opposition. However, it was not until after the end of World War 
II that the contours of a conservative movement began to emerge.
This article surveys this emergence in the early postwar years, and how 
the creation of a “counter-establishment” outside the established party system 
eventually enabled conservatives to conquer the GOP.2 It also analyzes some 
1 Some may contest the idea of a national “movement” and argue that there have simply been a number of 
conservative organizations at any given time. I base my claim, however, on organizational continuity, a will 
to cohere, and a deliberate intent to counter most parts of the alleged “liberal establishment” with conserva-
tive counterparts.
2 The defining work on postwar American conservatism is still George H. Nash, The Conservative Intel-
lectual Movement Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1976). The commonly accepted description of the 
movement as a marriage of convenience between separate strains—traditionalism, libertarianism, and anti-
Communism, comes from Nash’s book. Other valuable introductions to postwar American conservatism 
include Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater 
and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Hill & Wang, 2001); Geoffrey Kabaservice, 
Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, From Eisenhow-
er to the Tea Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). The organizational effort made to create 
a conservative “counter-establishment “prior to the ultimate plunge into partisan politics is the subject of 
Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement, 1945-65 (Copenha-
gen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2002). With her fine book Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conserva-
tive Movement from the New Deal to Ronald Reagan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), Kim Phillips-Fein 
has broadened the scope of American conservatism by focusing on the business community’s substantial 
contributions to the movement.  Other historians and sociologists have to a greater extent viewed modern 
American conservatism as a social movement—finding its sources of recruitment in opposition to “open 
housing ordinances,” busing, urban unrest, affirmative action, sex education in schools, and other alleged 
assaults on traditional American values. Among the works taking such an approach in analyzing the rise 
17standing athwart history, yelling stop
of the enduring ideological tensions within the movement and the limits they 
have imposed on its ability to present a positive political vision, hold “political 
territory,” or win over new constituencies, in the absence of a larger conceptual 
framework such as the Cold War or the “War on Terror.” Finally, it draws some 
lines from the conservative movement of the 1960s to the so-called “Tea Party 
Republicans” of the Obama era. It notes the ideological continuity, but also the 
diminished importance ascribed to intellectual credibility.
Accepting the Conservative Label
In American political culture, the label of conservatism had traditionally 
been associated with feudalism and aristocracy—with a rigid European 
class system, devoid of any appreciation of social mobility. After World 
War II, however, many laissez faire-liberals felt compelled to accept it any-
way, since the term “Liberalism” had been appropriated by the New Deal-
ers, with their alleged faith in “collectivism” and social engineering.3
The very idea of laissez faire—the belief that markets would be self-
regulating—had been politically discredited during the early years of the 
Great Depression. When a group of businessmen founded the American 
Liberty League as a vehicle for opposition to the New Deal, the Republican 
National Committee actually asked it to refrain from endorsing the Repub-
lican candidate Alf Landon in the election of 1936.4 
Occasionally, books advocating conservative/laissez-faire ideas would 
be published, but they were like lonely cries in the wilderness.5 By the end 
of the right are Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2001); Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right Wing Movements and Politi-
cal Power in America (New York: Guilford Press, 1995); Janice M. Irvine, Talk About Sex: The Battle Over 
Sexual Education in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), and Michael W. 
Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s  (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005). For an excellent historiographical essay of the postwar conservative 
movement in America, see Jennifer Burns, “In Retrospect: George Nash’s The Conservative Intellectual 
Movement in America Since 1945,” Reviews in American History 32 (2004), pp. 447-462.
3 The semantic battles of the labels of “liberal” and “conservative”—small or capital “C”—occasionally 
broke out throughout the 1950s. However, by the 1960s, most of the American right proudly used the label 
“conservative.”
4 For a history of the league, see George Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives: A History of the Ameri-
can Liberty League, 1934-1940 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962).
5 Among them were Albert Jay Nock, Our Enemy, the State (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, 1950 
[1935]); William Henry Chamberlin, Collectivism; A False Utopia (New York: Macmillan, 1937) http://
mises.org/books/falseutopia.pdf.
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of World War II, however, such books seemingly resonated with a new au-
dience. Among the new books that seemed to have an impact were Rich-
ard M. Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences and F.A. Hayek’s The Road to 
Serfdom.6 Particularly the latter managed to successfully link the notion of 
the welfare state to the growing fear of international communism. The argu-
ment was that there was a philosophical affinity between all “collectivists.” 
When Hayek’s book was first published in the United States in 1945, the 
reaction was surprising—not least to Hayek himself. Helped by a strong 
promotional effort by a couple of conservative funds, an abridged version 
of the book was distributed by Readers Digest in more than a million cop-
ies. Hayek soon found himself on a national book tour, speaking to large 
audiences. In New York City, some 3,000 people showed up to hear him.7 
Several conservative intellectuals would later refer to their reading of the 
book as a crucial event in their political awakening.
Hayek’s argument in The Road to Serfdom was that countries such as 
Great Britain and the United States were most likely to be taken down an 
unforeseen road to “totalitarianism” by well-meaning democrats adopting 
“planning” in their attempt to promote the general welfare of the nation, 
rather than by dedicated communists or fascists. Thus, “totalitarianism” 
would be an unintended consequence of the way in which economic plan-
ning would ultimately change the social and moral values of the nation. 
While this argument was not new on the American political scene, 
Hayek’s book now became essential reading for American conservatives.8 
Perhaps it was due to his status as an economist. Perhaps it was simply 
a matter of timing. In any case, there was a certain irony in the fact that 
much of the intellectual firepower for an emerging conservative movement 
in America came from European émigrés such as Hayek, his fellow Aus-
trian economist Ludwig von Mises, and Leo Strauss, as well as from the 
“rediscovery” of European conservatives such as the Anglo-Irish politician 
and political thinker Edmund Burke.9
6 F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: George Routledge & Sons Ltd., 1944); Richard M. Weaver, 
Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).
7 Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-tanks and the Economic Counter-revolution, 1931-83 
(London: Fontana Press, 1995), p. 101.
8 In 1936, Robert Taft had claimed that “If Mr. Roosevelt is not a Communist today, he is bound to become 
one.” Quoted from Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule & Ruin, p. 5.
9 Von Mises fled to the United States in 1940 and became a visiting professor at New York University. As 
for Leo Strauss, see Paul E. Gottfried, Leo Strauss and the Conservative Movement in America; A Critical 
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Stalin’s gift to the American right
The emerging Cold War presented an obvious dilemma for Conservatives: 
how to balance principles of small government with support for a global 
military and economic engagement in the Cold War. However, it also pre-
sented new political opportunities. The notion of a global struggle between 
and collectivism enabled a sort of “guilt by association” strategy against 
liberals, who were accused of being “soft on Communism.”
The Conservative attack on New Deal liberalism would come in two va-
rieties. One was that its ideas about public planning and the creation of a 
basic welfare state constituted a milder, but not necessarily less danger-
ous, form of socialism. Everything from Communism to the New Deal was 
branded together as “collectivism.” The argument was at the core of ex-
Communist turned conservative hero Whittaker Chambers’ book Witness, 
written after his participation in the famous case against Alger Hiss.10 Lib-
erals had continued to defend Hiss, he claimed, due to an instinctive kinship 
to Communism:
The simple fact is that when I took up my little sling and aimed at Communism, I also hit 
something else. What I hit was the forces of that great socialist revolution, which, in the 
name of liberalism, spasmodically, incompletely, somewhat formlessly, but always in the 
same direction, has been inching its ice cap over the nation for two decades.11
The other line of attack was that New Deal liberals were too weak to fight 
Communism, due to their ethical relativism. A lack of belief in an objective 
moral order made them incapable of understanding and reacting resolutely 
to the threat. They simply lacked what both Conservatives and Communists 
had: dedication and a sense of mission. This view was central to another 
book that helped shape the conservative movement in the early postwar 
years: Richard Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences.12 In Weaver’s view, the 
New Deal represented the final step in a long decline of Western civiliza-
tion—a decline caused by Western man’s loss of belief in transcendental 
values. 
The idea that the Cold War was, at its heart, a spiritual struggle, was also 
central to James Burnham, who became the conservative movement’s guru 
Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
10 Whittaker Chambers, Witness (London: Andre Deutch, 1953).
11 Whittaker Chambers, Witness, p. 566.
12 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).
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on power politics and the global struggle against Communism. Although 
his primary concern was with a clearly recognizable enemy, The Soviet 
Union, Burnham nevertheless talked about a possible “Suicide of the West,” 
because he found that it was the softness of liberals that made the threat 
mortal.13 Thus, he too helped establish a link between the movement’s cul-
tural antagonism towards Liberalism and Cold War national security con-
cerns.  
Like Whittaker Chambers, Burnham had also been a Communist in the 
1930s. They were both part of a large group of ex-Communists intellectuals 
(most of them Trotskyites), which historian John P. Diggins has called “Sta-
lin’s gift to the American Right.”14 Among the others were Louis Budenz, 
Frank S. Meyer, Max Eastman, Freda Utley, Elizabeth Bentley, William 
Henry Chamberlin, and John Dos Passos. These ex-Communists had sort 
a “takes-one-to-know-one” credibility to their anti-communism, but there 
was more to it. Bentley—a former Soviet spy who had been turned—ex-
plained why she had been unable to stop in the “mushy middle” and be-
come a Liberal: “People, who are genuine Communists, as I was, aren’t the 
lukewarm type. They can’t go into a vacuum if they give up Communism. 
They must have something to tie to.”15 The conservative movement pro-
vided that something.
Spreading the Conservative Gospel
In the early postwar years, this emerging movement was mostly an in-
tellectual phenomenon, but few accepted the notion that conservatives 
would remain a “remnant” in a liberal world for a very long time. The 
major intellectual concern was with political power and how to achieve 
it. A first step was the creation of journals and other fora. They could 
see conservative views expressed in the Hearst papers, in the New York 
Daily News, the Manchester Union Leader, and in the Chicago Tribune, 
but these newspapers could not serve as standard-bearers for a political 
movement. Among the first new journals which attempted to play that 
role were Human Events, founded in 1944, and The Freeman, founded in 
1946. The emerging movement also got publishers dedicated to publish-
13 James Burnham, Suicide of the West (New York: The John Day Company, 1964).
14 John P. Diggins, Up from Communism (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 3.
15 Time (November 29, 1948), p. 46.
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ing conservative books, including The Henry Regnery Company, Caxton 
Printers, and Devin-Adair Company.
In 1948, F.A. Hayek elaborated on why he and his like-minded had to 
emulate what the left had done a generation before. In an essay entitled 
“The Intellectuals and Socialism,” he noted that “in every country that has 
moved towards socialism, the phase in development in which socialism 
becomes a determining influence on politics has been preceded for many 
years by a period during which socialist ideals governed the thinking of the 
more active intellectuals.”16 
As Hayek saw it, Germany, England and France had long since reached 
that stage, while the United States had only reached it during World War II. 
“Experience suggests,” Hayek noted, “that once this phase has been reached, 
it is merely a question of time until the views now held by the intellectuals 
become the governing force of politics.”17 The critical step was to secure the 
transmission from the scientists and utopian thinkers to the “professional 
second-hand dealers in ideas.” This was why the creation of a conserva-
tive “counter-establishment,” with journals, publishers, think tanks, inter-
est groups and action committees, was considered a crucial step. From its 
founding in 1955, William F. Buckley, Jr.’s journal National Review became 
the most important intellectual hub in such a counter-establishment. 
Guardians of Civilization or the Voice of the “Silent Majority”?
William F. Buckley, Jr. (1925-2008), who in the following decades became 
a leading figure among conservative intellectuals, had once entertained 
plans about writing a book entitled The Revolt against the Masses (a play 
on Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset’s The Revolt of the Masses.18 
Like most conservative intellectuals in the early postwar years, he lamented 
an alleged vulgarization of American political culture and saw himself as 
part of a “remnant,” whose job it would be to, in the words of Albert Jay 
Nock, adhere to “the principles issuing in what we know as the humane 
life” and build up a new society “[w]hen everything has gone completely 
16 F. A. Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” The University of Chicago Law Review (Spring 1949), pp. 
417-433. Reprinted in George B. de Huszar (ed.), The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait (Glencoe, Ill: 
The Free Press, 1960), pp. 371-84.
17 Ibid.
18 Jose Ortega Y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1932).
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to the dogs.”19 The political aspirations of the conservative movement were 
defined—and inhibited—by a latent disgust for mass society and majoritar-
ian politics. 
Something happened, however, during the anticommunist crusades of 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. Not least the responses to Senator Joe Mc-
Carthy’s endless attempts to link New Deal Liberalism to Communism and 
treason, helped persuade many conservative intellectuals that the basic po-
litical instincts of the masses were perhaps healthy after all. As historian 
Fredrik Logevall has noted, “Eden and Churchill and other British Con-
servatives were mystified by the seeming support in Middle America for 
extreme Red-baiters such as Senator Joe McCarthy, who applied constant 
pressure on the White House to live up to their rigid standards of anticom-
munist purity.”20 
The particular role that anti-Communism came to play in America, paved 
the way for a more populist brand of Conservatism. Rather than the last 
guardians of Western civilization, conservatives began to think of them-
selves as spokesmen for a “silent majority” of Americans, with whom the 
liberal establishment had lost touch. 
The rabble rousing and opportunistic Joe McCarthy himself remained a 
potential embarrassment for an intellectual movement craving intellectual 
respectability, but many conservatives, including William F. Buckley, Jr., 
were intent on justifying “McCarthyism” as a principle. They attempted 
to elevate it to a noble attempt to create a “public orthodoxy.” The perva-
sive influence of McCarthyism also provided an opportunity to substitute 
resentment of intellectuals for more traditional forms of class resentment. 
Likewise, it changed the ethno-political placement of the conservative 
movement. The anticommunism of the “Old Right”—in the 1930’s and 
before—had often been closely connected with nativism, anti-Catholicism 
and anti-Semitism. Now the alleged subversives were found elsewhere, and 
Catholic individuals such as McCarthy and Buckley, as well as organiza-
tions such as the Knights of Columbus, had truly entered the cultural main-
stream. 
19 Albert Jay Nock, “Isaiah’s Job” in Free Speech and Plain Language (New York: William Morrow, 1937), 
pp. 248-265.
20 Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War; The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: 
Random House, 2012), kindle edition, location 7527.
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The Traditionalist/Libertarian Divide
If F.A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom had galvanized the American liber-
tarians, then Russell Kirk’s The Conservative Mind: From Burke to San-
tayana, published in 1953, became a primer for traditionalist conservatives. 
Kirk’s views were rooted in the belief that “[a] civilized society requires 
order and classes” and that “man has an evil nature and therefore must 
control his will and appetite.”21 This was clearly not the classical liberal-
ism of Friedrich Hayek, but somewhat ironically, also a European import: 
the organic Conservatism of Edmund Burke. Kirk and other traditionalists 
would, at least in principle, claim the primacy of preserving the social fab-
ric of the community over individual freedom. Real freedom could not be 
separated from self-restraint and a sense of duty towards the general interest 
of society. 
The liberal historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., for one, was not con-
vinced that Kirk’s aspirations matched political realities. He noted that once 
conservatives left the field of rhetoric, they tended to forget about Burke 
and “adopt the views of the American business community.” They leaped, 
as Schlesinger put it, “[f]rom Tory fantasy into Republican reality.”22 Many 
libertarians would agree that if there were an American tradition for con-
servatives to be claimed, it was built on a rationalist view of human nature 
and a worship of individual autonomy. The American Way was not based on 
order and a fixed social hierarchy, but on “creative destruction” and the idea 
of the market as the sublime selector of a “natural aristocracy.”23 America 
was the “land of new beginnings.” Freedom, libertarians would hold, did 
not mean the ability to recognize virtue, but freedom to choose, and maybe 
choose wrongly or irresponsibly.24 
To Kirk, on the other hand, the idea of freedom as a goal in itself was 
absurd. With an image borrowed from C. K. Chesterton, he compared it 
to liberating goldfish by smashing their bowl. That was beside the point, 
libertarians would retort. Libertarianism was a strictly political philosophy, 
21 Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana (Chicago: Henry Regnery Books, 1953), 
pp. 7-8.
22 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “The New Conservatism: Politics of Nostalgia,” The Reporter (June 16, 1955), 
p. 11, 76.
23 “Creative destruction” is a term coined by Joseph Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(London: Routledge, 1994 [1942]).
24 See Frank S. Meyer, In Defense of Freedom: A Conservative Credo (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 
1962), p. 53 ff.
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which did not consider morality to be a public matter. Half a century later, 
this basic split on the American Right would remain unresolved.
The traditionalist/libertarian debate illuminated a paradox that seems 
particular to American Conservatism: On the one hand, the libertarians, to 
whom loyalty to tradition and acknowledgement of the wisdom of the fore-
fathers were not serious political concerns, actually had few problems giv-
ing claim to a well-established tradition in the American political economy, 
while the traditionalists, who considered the claim to tradition an essen-
tial part of their political legitimacy, time and again had to invoke either 
Burke—or a larger Western tradition—in their attempt to construct a usable 
past. It was, as the American poet and political thinker Peter Viereck ex-
pressed it, “a traditionless worship of tradition,” or an “unhistorical appeal 
to history.”25  
Regardless of the ideological incoherence, the various strains of the con-
servative movement managed to work together most of the time from a set 
of shared beliefs. From 1955, National Review became a central hub for all 
of them. From the outset, William F. Buckley Jr. was devoted to the idea of 
fusing these different strains of Conservatism, although there were a few 
groups on the right that he quickly gave up on.26 
Buckley also accepted that some of the contributors to the journal never 
embraced the idea of “fusionism.” Russell Kirk, for one, maintained that 
the notion of a “libertarian conservative” was an oxymoron comparable to 
a “Muslim Christian” or a Jewish Nazi.” Conservatives and libertarians had 
nothing in common, he said, except for their detestation of collectivism.27 
Buckley’s critical role notwithstanding, what ultimately made the odd po-
litical partnership between traditionalists and libertarians work for decades 
was a common enemy. 
Even today, American conservatives are still mostly united by their com-
mon resentment of liberals. There are now “paleoconservative” non-inter-
25 Peter Viereck, “The Philosophical ‘New Conservatism,’ in Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right (New York: 
Doubleday & Company, 1963), p. 188.
26 One of them was the radical libertarian followers of the novelist Ayn Rand, whose atheism and worship 
of selfishness he profoundly disliked. For her part, Ayn Rand probably wasn’t all that troubled by the 
exclusion, considering her denunciation of modern conservatism as an “embarrassing conglomeration of 
impotence, futility, inconsistency and superficiality. Quoted from Eliza Simmons, “Who’s an Objectivist?” 
The New Guard (May 1962), p. 21.
27 Russell Kirk, “Libertarians: The Chirping Sectaries,” in George W. Carey (ed.), Freedom and Virtue: The 
Conservative Libertarian Debate (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), p. 113, 119-120.
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ventionists, who read The American Conservative and strongly disagree 
with the neoconservative readers of The Weekly Standard on most mat-
ters of foreign policy. There are also social conservatives, who read First 
Things, have theocratic inclinations, and are mostly concerned with issues 
such as abortion, gay marriage, school prayer, and the role of religion in the 
public space. They have obvious conflicts with the followers of Ayn Rand, 
Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky) and the radical libertarians. Now as then, 
however, regardless of the fact that conservatives have long since captured 
control of the Republican Party, all strains have to some extent preserved 
the sense of being under siege by a powerful liberal “establishment.”
Conservatives or “Counter-revolutionaries”?
While the Conservative movement of the 1950s undoubtedly was more 
closely tied to the Republican Party than to the Democratic Party, it was 
hardly made up of loyal partisans. While the majority of Republicans had 
accepted the basic framework of a limited welfare state in the United States, 
American conservatives were not looking to conserve the best elements of 
the New Deal order, but rather to overturn it. However, in order to dismantle 
government power, they would have to first win political power, and the 
first difficult step to doing that was winning control of the GOP, where 
moderate factions were still dominant. Actually, some of these factions 
also employed the notion of “conservatism” to describe their own efforts to 
modernize the Republican Party. 
Moderate Republicans talked about their basic acceptance of the welfare 
state as “dynamic conservatism” or “new conservatism.” One of the fora 
for such moderate views was the journal Confluence, founded in 1952 and 
edited by Henry A. Kissinger, then a graduate student at Harvard. To his 
mind, the movement conservatives were not really conservative: “It seems 
to me the essence of conservatism is to have change evolve from exist-
ing structures and to avoid sudden convulsive disruption. This means that 
evolution should be gradual, but also that one should not be unbending.”28 
Kissinger’s view was emblematic of a time that many scholars identified 
with pragmatism, “pluralism,” and a new bipartisan consensus. Much of 
the early criticism of the conservative movement emerged from this “plu-
28 Quted from Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin, p. 17.
26 American Studies in Scandinavia, 45:1-2
ralist” perspective, where “movement” conservatives were categorized as 
“pseudo-conservatives.29
Much to the displeasure of said movement conservatives, such views also 
came to characterize the policies of the Eisenhower administration. Sena-
tor Barry Goldwater from Arizona quickly branded it a “dime-store New 
Deal.” The pragmatism of Ike further encouraged movement conservatives 
to create independent organizational structures outside of the GOP with the 
explicit goal of “taking it back.” The idea of a betrayal by moderate “me 
too-Republicans” was central to their political thinking. 
In a sense the pluralists were right: the movement conservatives were not 
out to conserve: They were radical reactionaries—or, as William F. Buck-
ley, Jr. himself would suggest—“Counter-revolutionaries.” In his mission 
statement for the first issue of National Review, Buckley talked about how 
“the most alarming single danger to the American political system” was 
the way in which “an identifiable team of Fabian operators” was trying to 
control both major political parties in order to reshape them “in the image 
of Babbitt, gone Social-Democrat.”30
The Myth of the “Hidden Conservative Majority” 
In 1960, the conservatives were the smallest faction within the GOP, but 
they had the sense of being part of a larger movement beyond the party 
and speaking on behalf of millions of Americans who were not currently 
participating in the political process. However, despite a long list of orga-
nizations, it was difficult to assess the actual strength of this conservative 
network. Many organizations were mere “fronts” and letterhead groups 
with no real membership. Marvin Liebman, a pioneer in conservative fun-
draising, ran a long list of such front organizations directly from his office 
in New York.31 Over time, however, new organizations with actual members 
29 Among the best expressions of this pluralist approach to the study of the conservative movement are Daniel 
Bell (ed.), The Radical Right: The New American Right Expanded and Updated (Garden City: Doubleday, 
1963), Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1965), and Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism 
in America, 1790-1970 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).
30 William F. Buckley, Jr., “Our Mission Statement” National Review, November 19, 1955 (http://www.na-
tionalreview.com/articles/223549/our-mission-statement/william-f-buckley-jr).
31 See Marvin Liebman’s political memoirs Coming Out Conservative; An Autobiography (San Francisco: 
Chronicle Books, 1992).
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emerged. Thus, in 1960, the National Review crowd was instrumental in 
creating the New York Conservative Party and the conservative youth orga-
nization Young Americans for Freedom (YAF).32
In 1960, the movement found a political champion in Senator Barry M. 
Goldwater from Arizona. His book The Conscience of a Conservative—
ghost-written by William F. Buckley, Jr.’s brother-in-law, L. Brent Bozell—
became its new political manifesto.33 Goldwater was no Tory and had no 
governing philosophy. In his view, the primary purpose of winning control 
of the federal government was to lessen its influence. Goldwater wanted to 
occupy the White House as an insurgent. Not unlike the present day “Tea 
Party” Republicans, his mission in Washington would be to repeal existing 
laws, rather than to pass new ones. In the context of the ongoing struggle 
for civil rights, his message of granting more power to the individual states 
created new political opportunities for the GOP.
The obvious question to conservatives in the early 1960s was how they 
thought they could win at a time when liberalism clearly seemed to be in 
ascendance. Their answer was to suggest the existence of a “hidden con-
servative vote,” which would emerge on Election Day if the Republicans 
nominated a true conservative, rather than a moderate “me-too-Republi-
can.” They claimed that even voters who were not affiliated with the move-
ment would respect and reward principled stands more than moderation and 
prudence. Thus, the key was to offer them “a choice, not an echo.”34 
Barry Goldwater himself had suggested as much when he had withdrawn 
his candidacy after a brief struggle at the Republican National Convention 
in 1960: “We must remember that Republicans have not been losing elec-
tions because of more Democratic voters. Now get this. We have been los-
ing elections because conservatives too often fail to vote.”35
The dreams of a hidden majority were evidently shattered, when Gold-
water became the Republican nominee in 1964, and subsequently was 
buried in a landslide by President Johnson. It didn’t happen because true 
conservatives stayed at home, but because there were not that many, after 
32 See Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, Right Face, pp. 141-184.
33 (New York: Manor Books, 1974 [1960]).
34 A Choice, Not an Echo was the title of a widely circulated book written by conservative activist Phyllis 
Schlafly in connection with the Barry Goldwater’s presidential nomination in 1964 (Alton, IL: Pere Mar-
quette Press, 1964).
35 Quoted from John H. Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 
1968), p. 48.
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all. A Harris poll taken after the election indicated that of the 27 million 
Americans who voted for Goldwater, only 6 million could be character-
ized as dedicated supporters who wanted to take over the Party. The other 
21 million were simply faithful Republicans, who stuck with their party 
regardless of the candidate.36 Yet, the notion that ideological purity was the 
key to winning a national majority didn’t die on the American Right. Actu-
ally, it is alive and well in today’s Tea Party movement.
After the presidential election in 1964, many liberal commentators had 
been convinced that the conservative movement was dead. Historian Rich-
ard Hofstadter contended that Goldwater’s campaign “broke the back of our 
postwar practical conservatism.”37 In retrospect, however, it became clear that 
Goldwater’s defeat was more aptly described as the end of the beginning. 
Despite the fact that the conservative quest for ideological purity had 
helped pave the way for a new wave of social reforms, the campaign had 
been a baptism of fire for the movement conservatives. Some 3.9 million 
volunteers had gone to work for it—twice as many as for the Johnson cam-
paign.38 While the left-wing Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) drew a 
lot of public attention in those years, its membership never surpassed 1,500. 
Meanwhile, their conservative counterpart, Young Americans for Freedom 
(YAF), recruited 5,400 new members during the “Draft Goldwater” cam-
paign in the summer of 1964.39 Even more importantly, the campaign had 
been an important step in the “Southernization” of the Republican Party.
In the early 1960s, the Republican Party had been a broad coalition, with 
moderates and even a progressive faction in states like New York and Cali-
fornia. For its part, the Democratic Party still held on to large constituencies 
of social conservatives in the South. President Eisenhower had managed 
to win a few states in the upper South during the 1950s, but in the years 
between 1903 and 1960, not a single Republican Senator had been elected 
in any Southern state. By winning a special election in Texas in 1961, John 
Tower became the first to break the mold. 
Tower’s victory was perhaps an early sign of change, but it was Gold-
36 John A. Andrew III, The Other Side of the Sixties; Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of Conserva-
tive Politics (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997), p. 208.
37 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1979 [1965]), p. 115.
38 Sam Tanenhaus, The Death of Conservatism, p. 61.
39 Sam Tanenhaus, The Death of Conservatism, p. 61.
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water’s victories in five states in the Deep South in the midst of a national 
landslide, which indicated that a major realignment had begun. In the years 
that followed, an increasing number of Southern Democrats overcame their 
traditional hostility towards the GOP, while moderates and progressives in-
creasingly left the party. Racial and ethnic politics in the wake of the civil 
rights movement was at the center of this process, although they were often 
cloaked in more lofty debates about federalism and “states’ rights.” As the 
GOP gained ground in the South, in the following decades, the social values 
of the region in return transformed the party. Thus, it became both more 
coherent and more socially conservative.
Considering how significant a role they would later play, the marginal 
role of protestant fundamentalists and evangelicals in the American con-
servative movement of the 1950s and 1960s is quite striking. However, that 
changed during the 1970s—partly due to this process of “Southernization,” 
partly due to a significant effort to bring protestant evangelicals into the 
movement. 
There were of course some Christian fundamentalists on the political 
scene in the 1960s. Among them were radio preachers like Carl McIntyre 
and Billy James Hargis. However, their organizations were largely “letter-
head organizations.” Indeed, many protestant fundamentalists had an aver-
sion to getting involved in “worldly” affairs. During the 1970s that began 
to change in reaction to Supreme Court decisions or legislation concerning 
issues such as abortion, school prayer, gay rights, and the teaching of evolu-
tion. However, it was not until the 1980’s that conservative organizers really 
managed to create ecumenical coalitions within the movement and present 
a broader political agenda. In the words of historian Dan T. Carter, “Conser-
vative Christians had become Christian Conservatives.”40
The Extremists and the Conservative Gatekeepers
In the early 1960s, many liberals expressed great concern over what became 
known as ”the Radical Right”—organizations such as The John Birch Soci-
40 Dan T. Carter, “The Rise of Conservatism since World War II,” OAH Magazine of History Vol. 17, No. 2 
(January 2003), p. 15. For more on the rise of the Christian Right, see Matthew Moen, The Transformation 
of the Christian Right (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1992) and Clyde Wilcox,  God’s 
Warriors; The Christian Right in 20th-Century America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992).
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ety, the Liberty Lobby, and Christian Crusade. “Conspiracists” was perhaps 
the most apt ideological label for the members of such organizations, since 
they tended to see subversive activities everywhere—not least in the federal 
government. 
The John Birch Society, with around 60,000 members, showed remark-
ably little interest in geopolitics. Its primary concern was domestic sub-
version. The Birchers were convinced that America was already “60-80% 
Communist” and the battle almost lost. Some years before, its founder—re-
tired candy manufacturer Robert Welch, Jr.—had famously accused Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower of being a “conscious, dedicated agent of the 
Communist Conspiracy.”41 
Welch was convinced, though, that even the communists were mere tools 
for a much bigger conspiracy. The world was run by “insiders”—probably 
the Bavarian Illuminati in association with the Rothschilds, the Rockefell-
ers, and the Bilderberg Group. Their powerful tools included control of the 
Federal Reserve System and the Internal Revenue Service. 
Both the Kennedy administration and a number of governors around the 
country decided to investigate to what extent “Radical Right” organizations 
such as The John Birch Society constituted a genuine threat to American 
democracy. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy asked Walter P. Reuther 
of the United Auto Workers to head the federal government’s investigation. 
In a memorandum he concluded that the Radical Right posed “a far greater 
danger to the success of this country in its battle against international Com-
munism than [did] the domestic Communist movement.”42
In California, Attorney General Stanley Mosk came to a somewhat dif-
ferent conclusion. The John Birch Society was a nuisance, not a peril: “… 
formed primarily of wealthy businessmen, retired military officers, and 
little old ladies in tennis shoes.”43 In other words: only the rhetoric was 
extreme, and there was a long way from the Birchers to hate groups and 
paramilitary organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Minutemen. 
Peril to democracy or not, the Radical Right posed a serious dilemma for 
41 Robert Welch, Jr., The Politician (privately circulated manuscript, 1958). When the book was later pub-
lished, this controversial claim was removed (Robert Welch University Press, 2002).
42 Walter P. Reuther, “The Radical Right in America Today,” p. 15. Robert F. Kennedy Attorney General 
Papers, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library.
43 Quoted from Patsy Moore, “Display at County Law Library Commemorates Life of Justice Mosk, High 
Court’s Longest-Serving Member,” Metropolitan News-Enterprise, January 25, 2005. (http://www.met-
news.com/articles/2005/mosk012505.htm).
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a conservative movement eager to win intellectual respectability and take 
center stage in American politics. Leading figures like William F. Buck-
ley, Jr. wanted the passion of the Birchers and their ability to mobilize on 
the grass-roots level, but also realized that the organization, in the words 
of National Review publisher William A. Rusher, was “a Mecca for every 
crackpot in America.”44
Buckley and the National Review crowd made a few attempts in 1962 to 
distance their brand of “responsible Conservatism” from the Radical Rights 
endless stream of conspiratorial accusations, but hesitated. They also tried 
to persuade Senator Goldwater to speak out against the John Birch Soci-
ety, but he refused to do it. It was only after seeing what damage the label 
of extremism had done to Goldwater’s presidential campaign in 1964 that 
Buckley and his associates finally concluded that any association with the 
John Birch Society and other “Radical Right” organizations could become 
a kiss of death for their movement. 
In 1965, they finally took upon themselves the role as ideological gate-
keepers. In a coordinated effort, several organizations were written out of the 
movement. Thus, the leadership of the American Conservative Union (ACU) 
cancelled participation in a conference organized by “We, the People!” with 
the argument that “Conservatism cannot triumph if it allies itself with ide-
ologies which bear no relationship to responsible conservative thought and 
action.”45 The Birchers were written out with the same argument.46 This kind 
of ideological gatekeeping was deemed a prerequisite for making it possible 
to conquer the Republican Party and turn it into a vehicle for the movement.
From Birchers to Birthers
In comparing the so-called Tea Party Republicans of the present to the 
movement conservatives of the 1960s, one finds many of the same dynamics 
and many of the same tensions. However, something has clearly changed. 
Historian Sean Wilentz has noted that the “pressing historical question is 
how extremist ideas held at bay for decades inside the Republican Party 
44 Letter, William A. Rusher to L. Brent Bozell, September 28, 1961. The William A. Rusher Papers, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C.
45 Telegram from Robert E. Baumann, reprinted in “Bruce Deserts Conservatives,” Free Enterprise (October, 
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46 William F. Buckley, Jr., “On the Right” (syndicated column), August 17, 1965.
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have exploded anew—and why, this time, Party leaders have done virtually 
nothing to challenge those ideas, and a great deal to abet them.”47 
Part of the explanation may be that there no longer seems to exist an elite 
of conservative intellectuals, who can take it upon themselves—or have 
the authority to—serve as “gatekeepers” for the movement. There is also 
less faith in the autonomy of ideas and more interest in political strategy 
and rhetorical “framing.” Likewise, the quest for intellectual respectability 
no longer seems to be a major concern. Few conservatives now entertain 
romantic ideas about being the guardians of a civilization under assault. 
It was telling that the rise of the Tea Party movement also marked the 
return of some of the groups that Buckley and his fellow gatekeepers had 
written out of the conservative movement in the 1960s. With the help of 
cable-television host Glenn Beck, the publications of The John Birch So-
ciety and other representatives of “the Radical Right” have resurfaced and 
gained a new audience.48 
In 2010, The John Birch Society co-sponsored the annual Conserva-
tive Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Washington, D.C. Before that, 
Glenn Beck had re-introduced the writings of Willard Cleon Skousen—
Mormon, teacher at Brigham Young University, and former chief of police 
in Salt Lake City—to his audience of two million viewers. Back in the 
1960s, Cleon Skousen was considered a radical conspiracist, and deliber-
ately marginalized by movement conservatives. Now Glenn Beck singled 
out his writings as a personal political revelation. Within six months of 
this reintroduction, one of Skousen’s books had sold more than two hun-
dred and fifty thousand copies and was being discussed in Tea Party study 
groups across the country.49 
When Buckley died in 2008, former National Review editor David 
Klinghoffer lamented the conservative movement’s lack of anyone to play 
47 Sean Wilentz, “Cofounding Fathers; The Tea Party’s Cold War Roots,” The New Yorker (October 18, 2010) 
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the role of gatekeeper that he once did. It was now dominated by media 
figures, “demagoguery and hucksterism” and ruled by “the crazy-cons,” he 
claimed.50 Better than anything, this call for a “new Buckley”—repeated 
several times in the following years—illustrated both the insurgent nature 
of the conservative movement and the continuing right turn of the Repub-
lican Party: the activist, who had played such a crucial role in the move-
ment’s defeat of a moderate “establishment” was now himself remembered 
as a moderate establishment figure, who had once helped purging the radi-
cals from the party.51
50 David Klinghoffer, “From neocons to crazy-cons,” Los Angeles Times (August 1, 2010) http://articles.
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51 For one example, see David Welch, “Where Have You Gone, Bill Buckley?” The New York Times (Decem-
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